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Recent Cases
PROPERTY-DISTINCTION BETWEEN REAL PROPERTY AND CHATTEL
REAL-MINING LEASES-OPTION FOR PROFIT A PRENDRE

Thacker v. Flottmanl

Farrell and wife, by an instrument dated February 4, 1949, and denominated
a "Mining Lease and Option," gave "unto the lessee 133 days to prospect for
said clays, and in the event that the prospecting proves satisfactory and, if in
the opinion of the lessees there are sufficient clays to justify the taking of this
lease, then at the end of the said 133 days above mentioned this instrument shall
become a true and binding lease for the full term of years first above mentioned.

The instrument contained agreements relative to royalties, the keeping of
records, inspection by the lessors and rights of ingress and egress. It was further
provided that plaintiffs ("lessees") were given "the option within said term of
."

133 days" to purchase "such amount of clay as has been determined to exist. ..."
The lessors were to convey "by proper deed of conveyance . . .," in the event

the plaintiffs exercised the last mentioned option. Plaintiffs prayed for a judgment determining them to be the owners of the clay. Defendant admitted the
execution of the instrument of February 4, 1949, but denied that plaintiffs had

any right, title or interest in or to the described premises and further answered
alleging plaintiffs had abandoned the lease and forfeited all rights under the
aforementioned instrument. In addition, defendant alleged that on September 29,
1949, Farrell and wife leased the premises to him. The instrument of September 29,
1949, denominated a "Lease Contract," purported to grant to defendant, for a term
of one year, the exclusive right to prospect for and mine minerals and clay. Royalties
were provided for. Furthermore the "contract" provided that, at the termination or
renewal of the "contract" the defendant ("lessee") should have the right to purchase

the clay in or on the land, and if purchased, the Farrells would convey the clay by
appropriate deed. The trial court found for plaintiffs and defendant appealed. The

Supreme Court, Van Osdol, C., after considering the interests in dispute, held
that title to real estate was not involved in a constitutional sense,2 and ordered
that the cause be transferred to the St. Louis Court of Appeals, which affirmed the

decision of the trial court.3
It would seem that at first, the instruments involved in the controversy pur-

ported to give to the parties in the case a right to enter upon the realty, examine
it, and prospect for clay, coupled with an option or options which, if exercised,
would supposedly give plaintiffs a "binding lease" for three years or, as an alternative, plaintiffs might elect to purchase the clay. In addition, defendant's instrument

purported to give him an option to purchase the clay. It has been held that an
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instrument, which does not give a right to take minerals, but only to search and
prospect for them, with the additional right to elect to take the mineral rights,
does not grant a profit a prendre, but only a license coupled with an option, and
until the option is exercised, no interest in the land is conveyed. 4 At this point then,
the instruments would seem to have conveyed no interest in the Farrell realty, a
license being defined as "a personal, revocable and unassignable privilege conferred
either by writing or parol to do one or more acts on land without possessing any
interest therein."5 This statement does not always apply however. Judge Clark
classifies licenses as follows:
1. A license giving a privilege only is always revocable.
2. A license which gives a privilege plus the right to extinguish some legal interest
of the licensor. This is irrevocable, in the sense that after the licensor's interest
is destroyed, he cannot thereafter restore it. The classic example is a license to
extinguish an easement.
3. A license, which, if coupled with an enforceable interest of the license6s, is
generally irrevocable.
4. A license coupled with contractual rights so as to make the license irrevocable.
5. A license, upon the strength of which the licensee acts or changes his position,
is irrevocable. This is a doctrine at law somewhat analogous to the equitable
doctrine of part performance and the Statute of Frauds.6
It would appear then that the licenses in the instant case, if such they were, would
fall into Judge Clark's fourth category, as they were coupled with contractual
rights.
Nor would the options grant or convey any interest in the property; as the
supreme court pointed out in the instant case, an option does not convey any
interest but gives a right of election only. An option for a lease passes title to
nothing, either realty or personalty. If the instrument conveys no interest in the
property and imposes no obligation upon the "lessee," no leasehold is created until
the lessee elects to exercise his option; 7 or one may have an option not only to
lease, but to purchase mineral property, but here again, the option conveys no
interest, but gives only a right of election. It will be remembered that plaintiffs
had an option to take a "lease" of three years and an option to elect to take a
4. Mendenhall v. Klinck, 51 N. Y. 246, 247 (1872); Cahoon v. Bayard,
123 N. Y. 298, 301, 25 N. E. 376 (1890). The instrument in the prior case gave
the right to "explore, bore, or in any way and manner test and examine . .. for
oil ... ; and in case they find oil, or are satisfied there is any there, and elect to
take the same . . . , to convey to them . . ." And the instrument in the
second case provided "shall have the right to enter upon the premises . . . for
the purpose of prospecting and examining for mines and minerals; . . . and if he,

after making such examination and test, etc., shall be of opinion that they are
worth working, he shall then have the right to go on and dig, carry away and cause
to be worked such of the substances there to be found."
5. 17 R.C.L. 564.
6. CLARK, COVENANTS AND INTERESTS RUNNING WITH LAND, 24-64 (2nd
ed. 1947).
7. 58 C.J.S., Mines and Minerals,
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol18/iss1/9 § 166.
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conveyance of the clay. But neither option gave them any interest in the Farrell
realty, either a leasehold (a chattel real or personalty) or a freehold (realty).
It is readily seen from the above discussions of a license that a mining
licensee's position may not be too secure, especially if the licensee has a privilege
only. This situation is considerably remedied in Missouri by statutes.8 However,
8.

Mo. REV. STAT. § 444.010-.020 (1949), which provide as follows:
"44.010. Mineral land owner to post conditions under which mining
operations may be conducted thereon.-1. When any person owning
real estate in this state, or any person having a leasehold interest in
such real estate for mining purposes by lease from the owner thereof, duly
acknowledged and recorded in the county wherein the land lies, shall
permit any person or persons, other than their servants, agents or
employees, to enter and dig or mine thereon for lead, ore or other minerals,
with the consent of such owner or owners or lessee, he or they shall
keep a printed statement of the terms, conditions and requirements upon
which such lands may be mined or prospected, and the time during which
the right to mine or prospect thereunder shall continue, posted or hung
up in a conspicious place, in plain, legible characters, in the principal
office or place of business of such person or company in the county in
which said lands are situated, or in a county contiguous thereto, and
shall deliver to any persoil mining or prospecting, or about to mine or
prospect on said lands, and requesting it, a printed copy of such statement.
2. All persons digging or mining on said lands, after the posting up of
such statement, shall be deemed to have agreed to and accepted the terms
thereof, and shall, together with such owner or lessee, be bound thereby,
and upon failure or refusal to comply with the terms, conditions and
requirements of such statement, he or they shall forfeit all right thereunder, and the owner or lessee, as aforesaid, of such lands, may re-enter
thereon and take possession of the same, nor shall the receipt of any
ore or mineral by any such owner or lessee, after any such forfeiture has
been incurred, be deemed or taken as a waiver of such forfeiture.
444.020. Failure to post statement of conditions, effect-rights of
miners.-1. Whenever any such owner or lessee of real estate shall permit
any person or persons, other than their servants, agents, or employees,
to enter and dig for lead or other minerals on such real estate, with
his consent, but without such owner or lessee complying with the provisions of section 444.010, and such person or persons having so entered
upon said lands by the permission or consent of such owner or lessee as
aforesaid, and having in good faith dug or opened any shaft, mine, quarry,
prospect or deposit of mineral, or extended or opened from any shaft
or mine any room, drift, entry or other excavation, he or they shall have
the exclusive right as against such owner or lessee giving such permit or
consent, and against any person claiming by, through or under the owner
or lessee to continue to work, mine and dig such shaft, mine, prospect or
deposit of mineral so dug or opened by him or them as aforesaid, in said
real estate, with a right of way over such lands for the purpose of such
mining, for the term of three years from the date of the giving of such
consent or permit; provided, however, that if such person or persons, in
each case so mining as aforesaid, shall fail or neglect to work or cause
to be worked such shaft, mine, quarry, prospect or deposit of mineral for
ten days, not including Sundays, in any one calendar month, after commencing said work, he or they shall forfeit all rights to work, mine or
hold the same as against such owner or lessee, unless such failure or neglect
was caused by unavoidable circumstances, or by the act of such
owner or lessee or his agent, or unless such owner or lessee consent thereo; provided further, that such person or persons,
so mining as aforesaid, shall pay to the owner or lessee of said lands

Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1953
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these statutes have been interpreted to provide for a license only, giving no
interest in the soil or unmined minerals.9 But if no length of term for the license
is posted, the licensee has an irrevocable right to continue for the statutory term of
three years.10 Of further value to the miner (licensee) is the fact that an assignment of license is enforceable.11
The instruments in the instant case provided that plaintiffs were to have a
binding lease if they thought sufficient clay existed for "the taking of this lease,"
and the second purported to "lease" the land to defendant for a term of one year.
It becomes important to ascertain whether or not an actual lease could have
arisen under these instruments, or whether the interests would have been incorporeal hereditaments. The case of Boone v. Stover1 2 distinguishes the two,
the court emphasizing the possessory aspect of a true leasehold estate. It was there
held that "By a lease, the lessee obtains an estate in possession of the land and
its products, in respect to which he can maintain ejectment; but, in a license or
grant of an incorporeal hereditament the grantor does not divest himself of the
possession, and the liberty of working a mine or mines on it is not inconsistent with
the retention of possession by the grantor." The possessory aspect of the lease
would seem to be the controlling factor then in distinguishing a lease of the minerals
giving such permit or consent the royalty for mining thereon, at least
once every month, if demanded by such owner or lessee, by delivering
the same to him at or near the mouth or opening of such mine, shaft or
quarry, or at the nearest usual place of business of such owner or lessee, or
at any other place that may be agreed upon by such miner and owner
or lessee; which said royalty, unless otherwise agreed upon by them, shall
be the same in kind and proportionate amount as is paid by others
mining the same kind of ore or mineral on said lands to such owner or
lessee, or the value of such royalty in cash; and if there be no other
person mining on said lands on terms prescribed by such owner or lessee.
then he or they shall pay to such owner or lessee the same rate and kind
of royalty on lead ore or minerals taken out by him or them as is paid
by miners on lands nearest thereto belonging to other persons, or the
value of such royalty in cash.
2. Such owner or lessee or any real estate shall have a lien on all
minerals taken or dug therefrom for the royalty due thereon until the
same is paid; and if any such person or persons so mining shall refuse or
fail to pay such royalty to such owner or lessee or his agent, when
demanded as aforesaid, he or they shall thereby forfeit the right to
work such mine, shaft, quarry, prospect or deposit of mineral, and the
said owner or lessee may thereupon enter and take possession of the same."
9. G. M. Mining Co. v. Hodge, 185 Mo. App. 138, 170 S.W. 689 (1914).
10. Supra, note 9. Ashcraft v. Englewood Mining Co., 106 Mo. App. 627,

81 S.W. 469 (1904).

11. Ashcraft v. Englewood Mining Co., supra note 10.
12. 66 Mo. 430 (1877). An instrument which gave the lessee "the sole and
exclusive right of entering in and upon the lands ... for the purpose of quarrying,
cutting, crushing and removing stone, for the term of ten years . . . but not to
hold possession of any part of said lands for any other purpose" was held to
have created an incorporeal hereditament for term of years, and not to have
created a true lease on the minerals in place. Baker v. Hart, 123 N. Y. 470, 25
N.E. 948 (1890). "The distinguishing characteristic of a lease is that it carries
a present interest and estate in the land for the period specified, and the criterion
seems to be the right to the possession of the land, and if such right is not
conferred, the transaction is to be deemed a license." 16 R.C.L. 549.

https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol18/iss1/9
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in place from an incorporeal hereditament granting the right to remove them.
Indeed, the supreme court in the instant case stated that a so-called mining lease
usually grants only a right of removal and does not convey, for term of years,
the minerals in place; hence no possessory estate for years is demised. The
suprmee court seemingly analyzed the instruments as not intended as true leases.
If the interest is not a lease, the question arises whether it is a license or a
profit a prendre. The latter is an incorporeal interest in the land of another, forever
or for term of years, to acquire by severance something which, prior to severance,
was part of the land. A profit a prendre is assignable and the holder of the profit
has rights in rem,' 3 in that third persons as well as the grantor shall not interfere
with the exercise of the profit. This is said to be the factor which distinguishes a
profit a prendre from a license.' 4 The courts have often failed to clearly state
whether they are discussing a profit or a license, thus ignoring the distinction.' 5
It is submitted that from the language of the first instrument in the instant case
the parties intended a profit a prendre, as the first instrument used the term
"taking of this lease" and used the words "binding lease." The second instrument
purported to grant defendant "the exclusive right and privilege . .. " Furthermore,
the supreme court in the instant case in describing the interest of the "lessee" as
being non-possessory, used the term "estate," implying a profit, for such terminology
is clearly inapplicable to a license. The court further stated that this estate, or
right to remove minerals, "is real property subject," [italics supplied], but went
on to say that the estate may be one for term of years, and hence personalty, the
time limit or duration of the estate being controlling. 16 The supreme court also

13. 3 TIFFANY, REAL ESTATE PROPERTY § 839 et. seq. (3d ed. 1939).
14. 3 TIFFANY, REAL PROPERTY § 840 (3d ed. 1939).
15. 3 TIFFANY, REAL PROPERTY § 846 (3d ed. 1939), citing Boone v. Stover, supra note 12 for this point.
16. The supreme court in the instant case was of the view that a profit may
be either a chattel real or realty, citing MILLS & WILLINGHAM, LAW OF OIL AND
GAS § 5. It would seem that there is only scant authority which expressly holds
that a profit a prendre for term of years is a chattel real. Several old authorities
are of the view that profits may be in fee for life or for years. SHEPPARD'S ToUcHSTONE *238 2 BL. COMM. *20 et. seq.; 3 KENT'S COMM. *401 et. seq. But none of
them actually say that the right itself is personalty if for term of years. However,
it is submitted that the view of the Supreme Court of Missouri in the instant
case was sound. A true, possessory lease is personalty. Why then should not a
profit a prendre for term of years be personalty? RESTATEMENT, PROPERTY § 450,
Special Note, says: "In this Restatement the term 'easement' is so used as to
include within its meaning the special meaning commonly expressed by the term
'profit.'" And in § 454 (b) of the same work, it is said: "Depending on its
period of duration, an easement in gross may be, as an interest in land, either
real property or a chattel real. Thus, if it is to endure indefinitely or for a period
measured by the life of a human being, it is real property. If its duration is
measured by a definite period or periods of time, it is a chattel real." In accord is
2 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 8.10 (published by Little, Brown & Co., 1952),
stating that "The classification of an easement in gross as a chattel real or as
real estate depends upon the period of time for which it was created. If created
for a definite period of time it is a chattel real. If created for an indefinite period.
or one measured by a human life it is real estate," citing RESTATEMENT, PROPERTY
§ 454 (b); Goldman v. Beach Front Realty Co., 83 N. J. L. 97, 83 Atl. 777 (1912).

Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1953
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stated that leaseholds are personalty. We then observe that whether the "lessee"
of a,"mining lease" has a true leasehold of the minerals in place, or a profit a prendre
for a term of years, it is personalty and not realty. The estate for years then, be it
corporeal or incorporeal, must be distinguished from estates of inheritance, whether
corporeal or incorporeal, as they are realty.'m
A further distinction which must be made in these situations, and which the
facts of the instant case present, is between a profit a prendre in fee and a mineral
fee. It will be recalled that the instruments in litigation purported to give to plaintiffs and to defendant options to "purchase" the clay. The question could be
presented then as to what interests would have arisen had the proper party exercised his option and had the Farrells honored it. From the supreme court's discussion to the effect that these mineral rights are usually non-possessory, i.e.,
profits a prendre, it is likely that this would have been the interest, to wit, a profit
a prendre in fee rather than a mineral fee, which is a distinct, corporeal, possessory
estate.'8 A mineral fee, for purposes of ownership, is entirely separate from the
ownership of the surface. 19 The mineral fee may be created by grant,20 or by
exception, 21 or the original owner may himself retain the mineral fee by conveying
the "surface deed.22 The controlling question, in deciding whether there is a creation of a profit a prendre in fee, or whether there is a fee in the minerals in place,
is whether a poossessory estate of inheritance is conveyed or an inheritable "right"
is conveyed. 23
If the dispute is whether a possessory mineral estate is for years, or in fee,
2
a definite, determinative term will decide the issue. 4
It should always be kept in mind that whether the mining interest is in fee
or for term of years, or whether it is possessory or non-possessory, once the
For a vigorous criticism of the merger by the Restatement of easements and profits
see CLARK, COVENANTS AND INTERESTS RUNNING WITH LAND 8, 66, 80-81, 227-228
(2d ed. 1947).
17. Where there is a grant, bargain and sale to the grantee, "his heirs and
assigns" of "the free and uninterrupted use, privilege and liberty" to prospect for

and remove minerals, the grantee has an incorporeal hereditament in fee. Such a
grant is neither a lease nor a sale of the minerals in place, as no possessory estate

arises, although there is created a non-possessory estate in the grantee, a proflt a
prendre which may be assigned. Funk v. Haldeman, 53 Pa. 229 (1866). urther
authority for the proposition that a profit may be for years or in fee is 3 TIFFANY,
REAL PROPERTY § 842 (3d ed. 1939), stating that a profit may be created either
by deed or by lease.
18.
19.

36 AM. JUR., Mines and Minerals § 36.
3 TIFFANY, REAL PROPERTY § 846 (3d ed. 1939).

20. Wardell v. Watson, 93 Mo. 107 (1888).
21. Snoddy v. Bolen, 122 Mo. 479, 25 S.W. 932 (1894).
22. 36 Av. JUR., Mines and Minerals § 31.
23. Saltsburg Colliery Co. v. Trucks Coal M. Co., 278 Pa. 447, 123 At.
409 (1924).
24. This is so despite the fact that during the term of years the lessee
could lawfully remove all coal. Austin v. The Huntsville Coal & Mining Co., 72
Mo. 535 (1880), where the instrument used the terms "lease and convey, . . . for
the term of twenty years, . . . all the coal." The court held this was a leasehold

only and not a conveyance of a freehold estate in the minerals in place. The interest of the lessee was personalty.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol18/iss1/9
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grantee severs the minerals, whether on or below the surface of the ground, the
minerals are then chattels and are no longer realty, if the severance was for pur2
poses of removal. 5
The present case was ordered to be transferred to the St. Louis Court of
Appeals upon the ground that title to real estate was not involved in the constitu-

tional meaning. 26 This would seem to be in accord with prior decisions of the
Supreme Court of Missouri holding that a suit to specifically enforce a contract
to lease 27 a dispute involving the validity of a lease'28 a case involving the question
of to whom rentals were payable,29 a controversy over an undivided interest in a

leasehold,30 do not involve title to realty in a constitutional or jurisdictional sense.
To be within the meaning of the constitution, the judgment or decree must directly
affect or operate upon the title itself.3 '
CONCLUSION

By way of conclusion it is submitted that the portions of the two instruments
which gave permission to prospect gave licenses only; with options in the plaintiffs
to take either a profit a prendre for term of three years, or a profit a prendre in
fee; with an option in defendant to take a profit a prendre in fee. To determine
whether the interest is in fee or for term of years, the deciding factor is the existence
or non-existence of a definite time period of duration. To determine whether the
interest is corporeal or incorporeal, one must ascertain whether the parties intended
that a possessory interest in the minerals in place was or was not to have been
conveyed.
ROBERT F. PYATT
PROPERTY-RIGHTS OF RIPARIAN OWNER IN MISSOURI WITH RESPECT
TO OBSTRUCrION OF A NATURAL OR ARTIFICIAL WATERCOURSE

Happy v. Kenton
Defendants owned land at the southeast end of Snowden Lake, a U-shaped
natural lake extending across the county line between Ray and Carroll counties.
Plaintiff owned land at the southwest end of Snowden Lake. Prior to 1944, when
the water in the lake reached a certain height, it would flow southeastwardly out
of the lake at the southeast end across defendants' lands through a depression
and eventually into the Missouri River, 1% miles distant. In the latter part of
1943, defendants constructed a levee or dam on their land at the southeast end
of the lake, across the outlet through which the water had previously drained.
By reason of the dam, the water level of Snowden Lake was raised, and the size
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.

2 TIFFANY, REAL PROPERTY § 587 (3d ed. 1939).
Supra, note 2.
Blake v. Shower, 356 Mo. 618, 202 S.W. 2d 895 (1947).
General Theatrical Enterprises v. Lyris, 121 S.W. 2d 139 (Mo. 1938).
McCaskey v. Duffy, 335 Mo. 383, 73 S.W. 2d 188 (1934).
Drew v. Platt, 329 Mo. 442, 44 S.W. 2d 623 (1931).
State ex rel. Brown v. Hughes, 345 Mo. 958, 137 S.W. 2d 544 (1940).

1. 247 S.W. 2d 698 (Mo. 1952).
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1953

7

Missouri Law Review, Vol. 18, Iss. 1 [1953], Art. 9

68

MISSOURI LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 18

of the lake increased as much as three or four times its largest size prior to 1944,
and at times water overflowed at the southwest end of the lake onto the land
owned by plaintiff, damaging his crops. Plaintiff contended that the defendants
had obstructed a natural watercourse, and were thereby liable for ensuing damage;
defendants contended that they did not obstruct a natural watercourse but only
prevented surface water from flowirqg across their lands. From a judgment of
$11,000 for loss of growing crops for the years 1944-1949 defendants appealed.
The principal issue was thus narrowed to the question of whether defendants
had obstructed a natural watercourse to the injury of the plaintiff. The problem
was complicated by the fact that although there was evidence that the natural
outlet of the lake was across defendants' land, there was also evidence that the
outlet had been artifically deepened following the lines of natural drainage about
40 years before. The question of whether the outlet of Snowden Lake constituted
a natural watercourse2 was determined by applying the test used first by the
Missouri courts in Benson v. Chicago & A. R.R.,- and since approved in many
subsequent Missouri cases:
"There must be a stream usually flowing in a particular direction,
though it need not flow continually. It must flow in a definite channel,
having a bed, sides or banks, and usually discharge itself into some other
stream or body of water. It must be something more than a mere surface
drainage over the entire face of a tract of land, occasioned by unusual
freshets or other extraordinary causes. It does not include the water flowing in the hollows or ravines in land, which is the mere surface water from
rain or melting snow, and is discharged through them from a higher to a
lower level, but which at other times are destitute of water. Such hollows
or ravines are not in legal contemplation water courses."
On the same question the court applied a further test for a natural watercourse adopted in Place v. Uidon Township4 in which it was held that a slough
which was shown to be a natural drain and something more than a "mere temporary
conduit of surface water" was a natural watercourse. There was evidence in the
instant case that the drain or ditch was a definite channel in which water from
Snowden Lake flowed most of the year.
2. For an excellent discussion of the problem of the creation of riparian
rights on an artificial stream or watercourse see Evans, Riparian Rights in Artificial
Lakes and Streams, 16 Mo. L. REv. 93 (1951), citing some authorities to the
effect that riparian rights do not attach to artificial watercourses, but concluding
that riparian rights should attach, that "when a stream diversion has occurred
or an artificial lake, reservoir, or other body of water has been created and has
continued long enough to assume in the minds of those in the neighborhood a
settled condition, (sometimes called an appearance of permanency) the artificial
condition is now to be regarded the same as if it had been caused by nature
rather than by the hand of man." This author further concludes that "If the
new condition appears to be permanent and settled, the length of time of its
continuance is only one factor, though an important one, and the period of limitations of itself has no unusual significance."
3. 78 Mo. 504 (1883), quoting Hoyt v. City of Hudson, 27 Wis. 661 (1871),
which seems to have been the first case to use this test.
4. 66 S.W. 2d 584 (Mo. App. 1933). See also Schalk v. Inter-River Drainage
District, 226 S.W. 277 (Mo. App. 1920).
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol18/iss1/9
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The court cited Brill v. M.K.T. Ry. 5 where defendant constructed a ditch,
which became the new channel for a creek, and after 35 years dammed the ditch,
flooding plaintiff's adjoining land. There the court said "If the artificial channel is
substituted for a natural one, or is created under such circumstances as indicate
that it is to be permanent and to be a watercourse the same as though it were
created by nature, riparian rights may attach to it."
The court next considered defendants' contention that the escaping flood
waters were surface water and stated that "Many cases have been written and
much has been said concerning the relative rights and duties of landowners with
respect to natural watercourses and with respect to their treatment of surface
water. It has often been said that in Missouri we adhere to and enforce the
'common law rule' as opposed to the 'civil law rule.' Whether the rule in this
state is properly denominated 'the common law rule' has been questioned." The
court further stated, "However that may be and irrespective of terminology,
Missouri is committed to the doctrine that one may not obstruct a natural watercourse without liability for ensuing damages to others, but that one may otherwise
treat surface waters as a common enemy and obstruct their flow without liability
for ensuing damages so long as he does so reasonably and not recklessly or negli6
gently."y
The court concluded, upon a consideration of the evidence, that the drain or
ditch in the principal case should be considered as a natural watercourse, and
affirmed the verdict of $11,000.
The court gave little attention in its opinion to defendants' contention that

5. 161 Mo. App. 472, 144 S.W. 174 (1911).

See 3

FARNHAM, WATER AND

§ 827b (1904): "If the artificial channel is substituted for a
natural one, or is created under such circumstances as indicated that it is to be
permanent and to be a watercourse the same as though it was created by nature,
riparian rights may attach to it." Also see Id. § 575 (1904): "But if a watercourse,
in fact, exists, the fact that it is not an ancient one will not confer a right to
obstruct it. And the rule is not changed by the fact that the water was flowing
in an artificial channel."
WATER

RIGHTS

6. Keener v. Sharp, 341 Mo. 1192, 111. S.W. 2d 118 (1937); Goll v. Chicago

& A. Ry., 271 Mo. 655, 197 S.W. 2d 244 (1917); Webb v. Carter, 121 Mo. 147,
96 S.W. 776 (1906); McIntosh v. Rankin, 134 Mo 340, 355 S.W. 995 (1896);
Munkres v. The Kansds City, St. J. & C.B. R.R., 72 Mo. 514 (1880); Welton &
Edwards v. Martin, 7 Mo. 307 (1842); Blackburn v. Gaydou, 245 S.W. 2d 161
(Mo. App. 1951); Brink v. R.R., 17 Mo. App. 177 (1885); McGhay v. Woolston,
175 Mo. App. 327, 162 S.W. 292 (1913); Scott v. Missouri Southern R.R., 158
Mo. App. 625, 139 S.W. 259 (1911); Beauchamp v. Taylor, 132 Mo. App. 92,
111 S.W. 609 (1908); Standley v. Atchison, T. & Santa Fe Ry., 121 Mo. App.
537, 97 S.W. 244 (1906); Edwards v. Mo. K. & T. Ry., 97 Mo. App. 103, 71
S.W. 366 (1902). See also 67 C. J. Water § 289 to the effect that the common law
or common-enemy rule "is that surface water is a common enemy which every
proprietor may fight as he deems best, and that accordingly the lower proprietor
may take any measures necessary for the protection or improvement of his
property, although the result is to throw the water back upon the land on an
adoining proprietor, provided it is not done in such a way as to create a nuisance
and destroy his property. This rule, however, does not apply where a natural
or prescriptive watercourse is obstructed or interfered with to the damage of
another."
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waters escaping the lake in flood periods were surface waters, subject to diversion
without liability by plaintiff, so long as not done recklessly or negligently, although
a number of Missouri cases 7 deem such overflow surface waters. It is of interest
that most of the cases supporting this view involved drainage districts or railroads, both of which proceed under statutory authority in the construction of
levees or embankments which may affect riparian rights.
In City of Harden v. Norborne Land Drainage Distrct,8 it was stated that
"there are fifteen Missouri decisions holding that overflow out of banks from
rivers
or other watercourses in times of flood is surface water" and that "we have always
followed the common law doctrine that surface water is a common enemy, and
that each proprietor may ward it off though by so doing he turns it on his neighbor." However, it should be noted that the defendant here was proceeding under
authority of a statutory drainage act.
One writer has stated that Missouri "has shifted from one rule to the other
and back" as to liability for injury caused by water which escapes its natural
channel in flood periods. 9 However, a number of Missouri cases support the position
taken by the court.
In Jones v. Hannovan,'0 diversion of one small creek to another creek by
defendant, resulting in overflowing of plaintiff's land at times of flood, was held
to create liability, the court saying that as soon as surface water enters a stream,
it ceases to be surface water and constitutes a watercourse. In Schalk v. Inter-River
Drainage District,"- the rule that overflow of flood waters of a stream are to be
treated as surface waters was qualified "at least to the extent of holding that a
slough, which connects with a running stream only during high water, and through
which such overflow waters flow between well-defined banks and return to the
7. Sigler . Inter-River Drainage District, 279 S.W. 50, 311 Mo. 175 (1925);
Anderson v. Inter-River Drainage and Levee District, 309 Mo. 189, 274 S.W. 448
(1925) (overflow water at flood periods can be treated as common enemy if
channel of watercourse not obstructed); Adair Drainage District v. Quincy, O. &
K.C. R.R., 280 Mo. 244, 217 S.W. 70 (1919); Inter-River Drainage District v.
Ham, 275 Mo. 384, 204 S.W. 723 (1918) (overflow water from a stream is surface
water, but increased overflow caused by a levee creates liability under the constitutional mandate that private property shall not be taken or damaged for
public use without just compensation); Goll v. Chicago & A. Ry., 197 S.W. 244,
271 Mo. 655 (1917) ("overflow water in Missouri is surface water" where channel
not obstructed); Abbott v. Kansas City, St. J. & C.B. R.R. 83 Mo. 271 (1884);
McCormick v. K.C., St. J. & C.B. R.R., 57 Mo. 433 (18745; Harris v. St. Louis
San Francisco Ry. 224 Mo. App 455, 27 SW. 2d 1072 (1930); Brown v. St. Louis
& San Francisco Ry., 212 Mo. App. 541, 248 S.W. 12 (1923); Wells v. Payne,
235 S.W. 488 (Mo. App. 1921); Lee v. Inter-River Drainage District, 207
Mo. App. 500, 226 S.W. 280 (1921); Schalk v. Inter-River Drainage District,
226 S.W. 277 (Mo. App. 1920); Edwards v. Missouri Kan. & Texas R.R., 97
Mo. App. 103, 71 S.W. 366 (1902) (overflow waters are surface waters, but if
caused by obstruction of natural flow, there is liability for resulting damages);
Kenney v. K.C., Pittsburg & Gulf R.R., 74 Mo. App. 301 (1898) (if slough was
not watercourse defendant had a right to dam it up).
8. 360 Mo. 1112, 232 S.W. 2d 921 (1950).
9. 3 FARMHAM, WATER AND WATER RIGHTS § 889b (1904).
10. 55 Mo. 462 (1874).
11. 226 S.W. 277 (Mo. App. 1920).
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main stream, may be regarded as still a part of the stream and therefore not
necessarily surface water."12
The inability of the court to designate the Missouri doctrine of riparian rights
in terms of one of the commonly recognized common law doctrines is of no
moment in the principal case, it is true, since there were actual and substantial
damages. Under either the natural flow or reasonable use doctrines of riparian
rights there is liability for obstructing a natural or artificial watercourse where actual
and substantial damage results to plaintiff's property. 13
There are many differences between the two doctrines, however, which affect
the rights of riparian landowners, and which make it of more than academic
interest to determine, if possible, which doctrine the Missouri courts follow. The
differences between the two major doctrines are brought out in the following brief
summary of the features of each.
The natural flow theory 14 includes the concept that each riparian proprietor
on a watercourse or lake has a right to have the body of water maintained in its
natural state, not sensibly diminished in quantity or impaired in quality, subject,
however, to the privilege of each riparian proprietor to use the water to supply
his natural wants, and to make such other uses in connection with riparian land
not sensibly or materially affecting the natural quantity or quality of the water.
Thus all riparian proprietors have equal rights to have the water flow as it was
wont to flow in the course of nature, qualified only by the equal privileges in each
to make limited uses of the water. Under this doctrine, a cause of action arises
when there is an unprivileged use, even though there is no interference with the
use or harm done to the plaintiff. This doctrine is relatively definite and certain,
but is non-utilitarian in that it prohibits many beneficial uses of water which
cause no actual harm to anyone.
The reasonable use doctrine" 5 involves the concept that each riparian proprietor
is entitled to be free from an unreasonable interference with his use of the water,
and that each proprietor is privileged to make beneficial use of the water for any
purpose provided only that such use does not unreasonably interfere with the
beneficial uses of other riparian proprietors. This doctrine is entirely utilitarian and
tends to promote the fullest beneficial use of water resources. A cause of
12. Keener v. Sharp, 341 Mo. 1192, 111 S.W. 2d 118 (1937). Standley v. A.T.
& Santa Fe Ry., 121 Mo. App. 537, 97 S.W. 244 (1906): "Yet if the defendant,
by obstructing the flow of water in the channel of the stream caused it to overflow and thus become surface water, it would be liable for all damages occasioned
thereby." The court on this question in the principal case referred to 56 AM. JUR.,
Waters, § "75, p. 562, in which it is stated, "The great weight of authority, however,
is to the effect that both under the so-called 'common-law' or 'common enemy'
rule, a natural drainway must be kept open to carry the water into the streams,
and as against the rights of the upper proprietor, the lower proprietor cannot
obstruct surface water when it has found its way to and is running in a natural
drainage channel or depression." (No Missouri cases cited.)
13. 56 AM. JuR., Waters, § 12, p. 501; 41 L.R.A. (n.s.) 1221.
14. BIGELOW, CASES ON RIGHTS IN LAND, p. 149 (3d ed. 1945); 4 RESTATEMENT, TORTS p. 342 (1939); 15 Mo. L. REv. 166 (1950).
15. 4 RESTATEMENT, TORTS p. 344 (1939), and also page 346, in which the
American Law Institute adopts the reasonable use doctrine.
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action arises only when the use being made by the defendant unreasonably interferes with the use being made by the plaintiff. This doctrine is followed by the
American Law Institute in its -Restatementof the Law of Torts.

One writer has summed up the distinction between the natural flow and the
reasonable use doctrines by saying that the former emphasizes the right to the flow
of the stream and the latter the privilege of use.1 6
A third doctrine, in effect in a number of western states, is described as the
prior appropriation doctrine," 7 and gives a priority on use of water to the first user.
This doctrine is beyond the scope of this note, and probably not of interest in
Missouri, since it is primarily statute law, and generally administered by administrative tribunals.
Because England presently follows the natural flow theory, it may be that
the natural flow doctrine was a part of the law of England in 1606, the year
selected by Missouri when it adopted the common law in 1816,18 and that Missouri is committed by statute to the natural flow theory. However there is
considerable doubt that the natural flow doctrine was the law of England prior
to 1606, and for a significant period beyond that date. One writerlo shows that as
late as 1831, cases were decided in England upon the doctrine of prior appropriation,
citing the case of Liggins v. Inge,20 and that the natural flow doctrine was first
employed in the case of Mason v. Hill,21 decided in 1833. This writer demonstrates

that the natural flow doctrine was derived from the civil law, particularly from
the Code Napoleon, was introduced into American jurisprudence by Kent and
Story, and was adopted from the American decisions by the English court in
1833,22 It was not until 1851 that the case of Enbry v. Owen 23 was decided,

and it is this case which is widely cited as the leading case on the English
16. Kinyon, What Can a Riparian Proprietor Do?, 21

MINN.

L. REV. 512

(1937).

17. See note 14, supra.
18. Act Jan. 19, 1816, 1 Mo. Terr. Laws, § 1, page 436; Mo. Rav. STAT. §
1.010 (1949).
19. Weil, Origin and Comparative Development of the Law of Water Courses
in the Common Law and in the Civil Law, 6

CALIF.

L REV. 245 (1918).

20. 7 Bing. 682, 131 Eng. Rep. 263 (1831); "And, by the law of England,
the person who first appropriates any part of the water flowing through his own
land to his own use has the right to use as he thus appropriates against any others,"
21. 3 B. & Ad. 304, 110 Eng. Rep. 114 (1832); "Every proprietor has an
equal right to use the water which flows in the stream; and consequently no
proprietor can have the right to use the water to the prejudice of any other
proprietor." 5 B. & Ad. 1 (1833): "There is no authority in our law that the first
occupant has any right, by diverting the stream, to deprive the owner of tile
land below, of the special benefit and advantage of the natural flow of water
therein."
22. See note 18, supra. In support of the view that the natural flow doctrine
came to England via American decisions see the Chancery Case of Wright v.
Howard, 1 Sim. & Stu. 190 (1823), in which it was stated "no proprietor can
either diminish the quantity of water which would otherwise descend to the
proprietors below, nor throw the water back upon the proprietors above." Cited as
authorities for this holding were Hatch v. Dwight, 17 Mass. 288 (1821) and 3
KENT COMM. *442 (2d ed. 1832).
23. 6 Exch. 353, 20 L.J. Exch. 212, 155 Eng. Rep. 579 (1851).
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol18/iss1/9
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doctrine of natural flow. Another writer,2 4 after reviewing the facts just stated,
concludes that the English cases are at best only persuasive authority, that the
adoption of the common lav did not ipso facto fix the property rights of a riparian
owner in a stream, and the American courts which have not expressly adopted
the English doctrine by decision are free to follow the reasonable use doctrine.
25
Missouri cases bear out this view.
A search of the decisions in Missouri brings to light no instances where
nominal damages or an injunction were granted for obstruction or diversion of
flow of a watercourse where no actual damage was shown. Such a case would
be an indication that the natural flow doctrine was being followed. There are
several instances of obiter dicta in the cases, however, in which language was
used which would seem to indicate that Missouri would follow the natural
flow doctrine.
In Griesinger v. Kleinhardt,2 6 decided by the supreme court in 1928, involving
the right of a riparian owner on an artificial lake created by the damming of a
creek to have the level of the lake maintained and not arbitrarily lowered by
another riparian owner, the court said "The right to the flow of a natural nonnavigable stream, in its natural way, applies to the upper and lower owners of
land across which the stream flows. That may apply with equal force to a
stream diverted to an artificial channel."
In Dardenne Realty Co. v. Abeken,27 decided in 1937 by the St. Louis Court
of Appeals, an upper riparian owner dammed the channel of a creek and diveited
the water to maintain several artificial lakes which he had constructed. The
court affirmed the action of the trial court in issuing a mandatory injunction to
24. Teass, Water and Watercourses-Riparian Rights, 18 VA. L. REV. 223

(1932).
25. Dickey v. Volker, 321 Mo. 235, 11 S.W. 2d 278 (1928) (Considering a
contention that decided cases in England prior to the 4th year of the reign of
James the First were a fortiori the common law rule on the same question in
Missouri by reason of the statute adopting the common law, the court held that
such decisions are "only evidence of law."); Musser v. Musser, 281 Mo. 649, 221
S.W. 46, 48 (1920) (In construing a will under the laws of Kansas, which declare
the common law to remain in force, the court said "Precedents elsewhere established by courts under the common law system, whether in England or one of our own
states, may serve as guides to a court in the absence of its own former rulings, in
determining what the applicable principle of the common law is in a given case.
Further than this their province is purely persuasive and they rise to the dignity
of rulings in a particular jurisdiction only when given judicial sanction."); Dean
v. Lee, 227 Mo. App. 206, 52 S.W. 2d 426, 429 (1932) (Referring to a contention
that decisions of the English courts prior to 1607 were a part of the jurisprudence
of Missouri and binding on Missouri courts, it was stated "the true rule seems to
be that the courts of this state, under the statutory provision cited, must determine
what the common law was, prior to the year 1607, and that the decisions of the
court prior to that time are evidence of what those courts declared the common
law to be."); Robertson v. Jones, 355 Mo. 828, 136 S.W. 2d 278, 279 (1940)
("It is true the common law of England, so far as it is applicable, is in force in this
state except where changed by statute"); Cook v. Cook, 232 Mo. App. 994, 124
S.W. 2d 675 (1939); L. E. Lines Music Co. v. Holt, 332 Mo. 749, 60 S.W. 2d 32,
61 S.W. 2d 326 (1933).
26. 321 Mo. 186, 9 S.W. 2d 978 (1928).
27. 232 Mo. App. 945, 106 S.W. 2d 966 (1937).
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restrain defendants from interfering with or diminishing the actual flow of the
creek and diverting any water therefrom except for domestic purposes.
It therefore appears that there is some basis by way of statute, and rather
more basis by way of dictum, to support the view that should a proper case be
presented, the Missouri court would designate the natural flow doctrine as the
Missouri doctrine, and grant an injunction or norminal damages, preventing
acquisition of a prescriptive right to continue the obstruction or use.
On the other hand, as previously expressed, there is considerable logical
reasoning to support the view that the Missouri court is not bound by the
statute adopting the common law of England, since that law was not at all
clear at the time adopted by statute in Missouri, and that the court, not being
bound by adoption of any specific doctrine in its previous decisions, is free to
adopt the natural flow, reasonable use, or even the prior appropriation doctrine,
or modification of one or more of these doctrines.
Perhaps with the increasing trend toward the use of water from the smaller
streams of Missouri for irrigation of ordinary cropland 2s and the widespread
practice of terracing farm land to control the flow of surface water along the
lines of natural drainage, 29 cases will be presented involving diversion of perceptible quantities of water for irrigation purposes or erosion control which does
not cause actual and substantial damage to other riparian owners. Such cases
would involve the possible acquisition of prescriptive rights, and would probably
require the Missouri court to define its position on riparian rights more clearly.
PAUL A. HANNA
PROPERTY-SURFACE WATER-DRAINAGE-POLLUTION

Clark v. City of Springfield'
Defendant city maintained near plaintiff's premises a sanitary sewer which
drained in the direction of plaintiff's home. This sanitary sewer was also used as
a storm sewer to transport rain water which had been collected from the streets.
It appeared that on numerous occasions after ordinary rainfalls the pressure of
the water and sewage forced off the manhole covers located near plaintiff's home,
causing filth and human excrement to boil and spout into the air and flow along
the ground onto plaintiff's property. At the times when the pressure of the water
and sewage was not sufficient to force the covers from the manholes, the rav sewage
and water would spurt up through the holes in the covers and thus flow onto
plaintiff's premises. After this water receded, deposits of raw human excrement,
filth, etc., were left upon plaintiff's property, causing odors and contaminating a
well used by plaintiff for drinking and household purposes. The defendant city
also maintained a storm sewer to collect the surface waters from the drains and
28. Rubey, Supplemental Irrigation for Missouri and Regions of Similar
Rainfall, U. OF Mo. ENGINEERING Exp. STA. BULL. No. 33 (Revised 1951).
29. Clark and Wooley, Terracing for Erosion Control, U. OF Mo. AG. ExP.
STA. BULL. No. 507 (July, 1947).
1. 241 S.W. 2d 100 (Mo. App. 1951).
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gutters in that section of the city. This storm sewer conducted the water to a
point near plaintiff's home where the surface water was discharged on neighboring
lands, from which point it flowed by force of gravity down upon plaintiff's
premises.
In a suit for damages sustained by reason of the above nuisance, plaintiff
offered evidence that the conditions complained of could have been alleviated by
an extension of the storm sewer and use of a stronger pump in the sanitary sewer,
and that plaintiff and a neighbor had offered defendant city a right of way to
extend the storm sewer. The city defended on the ground that plaintiff's property
was located in the natural passage point for drainage water; and that the sewers
were constructed in 1936, more than ten years prior to the commencement of this
suit so that plaintiff's suit was barred by the statute of limitations. The plaintiff
recovered judgment for $3,020, and defendant city appealed.
The Springfield Court of Appeals held that the inundation of plaintiff's
premises was by surface water, and applied the common enemy doctrine. Under
this doctrine, the court said that a proprietor of land may guard against the surface
water or divert it from his premises. But this was qualified by the provision that
the rights given under the common enemy doctrine must be exercised within
reasonable limits, and not recklessly, so as not to injure needlessly the servient
tenements; and the court applied the rule that one cannot artificially impound or
collect surface water and cast it in increased and destructive quantities upon the
servient estate to its damage.
The court agreed that nuisance was the proper theory of plaintiff's suit.
Quoting with approval from the case of Paddock v. Somes, 2 the court held that:
"An actionable nuisance may, therefore, be said to be anything wrongfully done or
3
permitted, which injures or annoys another in the enjoyment of his legal rights."
The inundation of plaintiff's property with the mixture of surface and sewer water,
the scum of filth left after it had receded, and the noxious odors therefrom, were
certainly an interference with plaintiff's premises and his legal rights to enjoy them.
The defense of the statute of limitations was rejected by the court. It was indicated that this might have been a valid defense had this been a permanent
nuisance. But since the evidence showed that it was temporary in character and
abatable, it was held that the statute of limitations was not applicable.
There are two major rules which have been applied to determine liability for
interference with surface waters. The first of these is the English "civil-law" rule.
Under this rule the owner of the upper or dominant estate has a legal and natural
easement in the lower or servient estate for the drainage of surface water, flowing
in its natural course and manner. The natural flow of water may not be interrupted or prevented by the servient owner to the detriment or injury of the
dominant estate. The other major rule is the "common law" or "common enemy"
rule. Under this doctrine no natural easement exists in favor of the dominant estate
for the drainage of surface water; the proprietor of the lower estate may at his
2. 102 Mo. 226, 237, 14 S.W. 746, 749, 10 A.L.R. 254 (1890).
106 of(1951).
100 atSchool
S.W. of2dMissouri
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option lawfully obstruct, hinder, or divert the flow of such water thereon without
liability by reason of such obstruction or diversion. To this latter doctrine, some
courts have added the qualification that the obstruction or diversion by the lower
owner must be reasonable in view of the uses to which the dominant and lower
estates are put.4 Another rule, adopted by the Restatement of Torts,' is the "reasonable use rule." Under this rule the liability for interference with surface water
is dependent upon the reasonableness of the benefit to the upper estate as compared with the injury to the lower estate. Regardless of the rule adopted, the
courts are almost unanimous in holding that the owner of the higher land may
not artificially collect the surface water and discharge it at one place and in increased
quantities upon the lower land. 6
The Missouri courts have not been consistent in applying any one of the above
rules. In the early case of Laumier v. Francis,7 the court indicated that it would
follow the civil-law rule. But in 1874 the court, again by dictum, indicated that
it would follow the common enemy rule,8 and this rule was applied to the surface
water cases during the next five years.9 Then in 1879 the case of McCormick v.
Kansas City, St. Joseph & Council Bluffs R.R. 1° came up on second appeal. Although the court based plaintiff's right of action on the damage caused by collection and discharge of surface water, the court quoted with authority the law
applied by civil-law jurisdictions. The judge writing the opinion seemed to assume
throughout the opinion that the civil-law rule is applicable in Missouri. Later the
same year, the civil-law was applied to decide a case,"' but this seems to be the
only time this rule has been applied in Missouri. In 1883, in the case of Benson v.
Chicago & Alton R.R. 2 the court again applied the common enemy rule, apparently not noticing that the court had earlier departed from this rule.13 But the next
year, in a landmark case, 14 the court recognized the variances in Missouri law, and,
after discussing the history and merits of the two doctrines, readopted the common enemy rule, expressly rejecting the McCormick and Shane cases. Since that

4. For a more complete discussion,'see 56 AM. JuR. 550-554.
5. RESTATEMENT, TORTS §§ 822-864 (1934). This has been applied in New
Hampshire, Franklin v. Durgee 71 N.H. 186 (1901) and possibly in Minnesota,
Bush v. City of Rochester, 191 Minn. 591, 255 N.W. 256 (1934). See also, Kinyon
and McClure, Interference with Surface Waters, 24 MINN. L. Rnv. 891 (1940).
6. 56 AM. JuR. 555-556.

7. 23 Mo. 181 (1856).
8. Jones v. Hannover, 55 Mo. 462 (1874).
9. Hosher v. K.C., St. Joseph & C.B. R.R., 60 Mo 329 (1875); Munkers v.
K.C., St. Joseph & C.B. R.R., 60 Mo. 334 (1875); McCormick v. Kansas City,
St. Joseph & Council Bluffs R.R., 57 Mo. 433 (1874); Imler v. City of Springfield,
55 Mo. 119 (1874).
10. 70 Mo. 359 (1879).
11. Shane v. Kansas City, St. Joseph & Council Bluffs R.R., 71 Mo. 237
(1879).
12. 78 Mo. 504 (1883).
13. The court, in recognizing the McCormick case, said it dealt only with
the collection and discharge rule.
14. Abbott v. Kansas City, St. Joseph & Council Bluffs R.R., 83 Mo. 271
(1884).
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time, the Missouri courts have consistently followed a form of the common enemy
rule.15
It is not clear whether the Missouri courts have adopted the strict common
enemy rule, or whether they have adopted the common enemy rule with the socalled reasonableness qualification. In several cases where the common enemy
rule has been applied, it has been stated in terms of the reasonableness qualification.' 6
In all these cases, however, the added reasonableness qualification was only
dictum-the same result would have been reached following the strict common
enemy rule. Rather, it seems that the courts have intended to apply only the
strict common enemy rule. In Beauchamp v. Taylor'7 the instruction of the trial
court was one under the reasonableness qualification. In reversing the trial court,
the court of appeals said that the reasonableness qualification applies only to the
negligence and recklessness with which the work is done, and not to the necessity or the reasonableness of the injury as compared to the benefit received.18 And
in Johnonv. Leazeneby' 9 the facts were such that the application of the reasonableness qualification might have changed the decision. However, the court applied
the strict common enemy rule, couching it in terms that did not include any suggestion of the reasonableness qualification. It is to be noted that the court in
15. Anderson v. Inter-River Drainage & Levee District 309 Mo. 189, 274 S.W.
448 (1925); Adair Drainage District v. Quincy, Omaha & Kansas City R.R., 280
Mo. 244, 217 S.W. 70 (1919); Goll v. Chicago & Alton Ry., 271 Mo. 655, 197
S.W. 244 (1917); Cox v. Hannibal & St. Joseph R.R., 174 Mo. 558, 74 S.W. 854
(1903); Rychlicki v. City of St. Louis, 98 Mo. 497, 11 S.W. 1001, 4 L.R.A. 594
(1889); Jones v. St. Louis, Iron Mountain & Southern Ry., 84 Mo. 151 (1884);
Stewart v. City of Clinton, 79 Mo. 603 (1883); Casanover v. Villanova Realty
Co., 209 S.W. 2d 556 (Mo. App. 1948); Tackett v. Linnebrink, 112 S.W. 2d 160
(Mo. App. 1938); Place v. Union Tp., 66 S.W. 2d 584 (Mo. App. 1933) (dictum);
Funke v. St. Louis-San Francisco Ry., 225 Mo. App. 347, 35 S.W. 2d 977 (1931);
Kiger v. Sanko, 1 S.W. 2d 218 (Mo. App. 1927); Farrar v. Shuss, 221 Mo. App. 472,
282 S.W. 512 (1926); Gibson v. City of St. Joseph, 216 S.W. 50 (Mo. App. 1919);
Johnson v. Leazenby, 202 Mo .App. 232, 216 S.W. 49 (1919); Jesel v. Benas, 177
Mo. App. 708, 160 S.W. 528 (1913); Weishar v. Sheridan, 168 Mo. App. 181, 153
S.W. 64 (1912); Walther v. City of Cape Girardeau, 166 Mo. App. 467, 149 S.W.
36 (1912); Thoele v. Marvin Planing Mill Co., 165 Mo. App. 707, 148 S.W. 413
(1912); Grant v. St. Louis, Iron Mountain & Southern Ry., 149 Mo. App. 306,
130 S.W. 80 (1910); Thompson v. Chicago, Milwaukee, & St. Paul Ry., 137 Mo.
App. 62, 119 S.W. 509 (1909); Mehornray v. Foster, 132 Mo. App. 229, 111 S.W. 882
(1908); Beauchamp v. Taylor, 132 Mo. App. 92, 111 S.W. 609 (1908); Applegate
v. Franklin, 109 Mo. App. 293, 84 S.W. 347 (1904); Burke v. Missouri Pacific Ry.,
29 Mo. App. 370 (1888); Schneider v. Missouri Pacific Ry., 29 Mo. App. 68 (1888);
Martin v. Benoist, 20 Mo. App. 262 (1886) (dictum); Hoester v. Hemsath, 16
Mo. App. 485 (1885).
16. Hosher v. K.C., St. Joseph & C.B. R.R., 60 Mo. 329 (1875); McCormick
v. Kansas City, St. Joseph & Council Bluffs R.R., 57 Mo 433 (1874); Young v.
Moore, 236 S.W. 2d 740 (Mo. App. 1951); Lee v. Inter-River Drainage District,
226 S.W. 280 (Mo. App. 1920); Schalk v. Inter-River Drainage District, 226 S.W. 277
(Mo. App. 1920); Beauchamp v. Taylor, 132 Mo. App. 92, 111 S.W. 609 (1908);
Goettenetroeter v. Kappelmann, 83 Mo. App. 290 (1899); and 88 Mo. App. 449
(1901); Freudenstein v. Heine, 6 Mo. App. 287 (1878).
17. Supra n. 15.
18. 132 Mo. App. 96, 111 S.W. 609, 611 (1908).
19. by202
Mo. App.
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the principal case announced the law in terms of the common enemy rule with
the reasonableness qualification, but only by dictum. 20 Just what the law in
Missouri is must await a more precise decision.
The holding of the court in the principal case that one cannot collect and
discharge surface water in increased quantities upon the servient estate to its
injury follows the majority, if not unanimous, law in this country, 21 and the
previous Missouri cases. 22 However, this was somewhat modified in the case of
Thompson v. Chicago, Milwaukee & St. Paul Ry.2 3 where the court says that
the collection and discharge rule does not apply when it is incidental to improvement
of the dominant land in a proper manner-i.e., there is no negligence or wanton
recklessness in the improvement of the land.
It should be noted that if the defendant city, in the principal case, had
violated none of the surface water rules discussed supra, the plaintiff still had a
valid cause of action. While this point was not discussed by the court, the owner
of the dominant estate may not lawfully pollute surface water, and then allow
it to flow onto the servient estate in the polluted condition.24 As stated by Tiffany:
"An owner of land has no right to pollute surface water on his land and to allow
it to flow in a polluted condition on the land of an adjoining owner. Such action
on his part, in so far as it interferes with the possible enjoyment of the adjoining
land, involves the maintenance of a nuisance. '' 25 By discharging the sewage and
20. 241 S.W. 2d 100, 104 (Mo. App. 1951).
21. Supra n. 5.
22. Polich v. Hermann, 219 S.W. 2d 849 (Mo. App. 1949); Casanover v.
Villanova Realty Co., 209 S.W. 2d 556 (Mo. App. 1948); Vollrath v. Wabash
Ry., 65 F. Supp. 766 (W.D. Mo. 1946); Funke v. St. Louis-San Francisco Ry., 225
Mo. App. 347, 35 S.W. 2d 977 (1931); Zook v. City of Louisiana, 12 S.W. 2d 518
(Mo. App. 1929); Bodam v. City of New Hampton, 290 S.W. 621 (Mo. App. 1927);
Kiger v. Sanko, 1 S.W. 2d 218 (Mo. App. 1927); Tucker v. Hagan, 300 S.W. 301
(Mo. App. 1927); Farrar v. Shuss, 221 Mo. App. 472, 282 S.W. 512 (1926); Bielman v. City of St. Joseph, 260 S.W. 529 (Mo. App. 1924); Lynch v. St. Louis,
Kansas City & Colorado Ry., 180 Mo. App. 169, 168 S.W. 224 (1914); Weishar v.
Sheridan, 168 Mo. App. 181, 153 S.W. 64 (1912) (malicious collection and discharge); Lewis v. City of Springfield, 142 Mo. App. 84, 125 S.W. 824 (1910);
Mehonray v. Foster, 132 Mo. App. 229, 111 S.W. 882 (1908); Reedy v. Missouri
Pacific Ry., 98 Mo. App. 467 (1903); Reedy v. St. Louis Brewing Ass'n., 161 Mo.
523, 61 S.W. 859, L.R.A. 805 (1910); Cannon v. City of St. Joseph, 67 Mo. App.
367 (1896); Carson v. City of Springfield, 53 Mo. App. 289 (1893); Rychlicki v.
City of St. Louis, 98 Mo. 497, 11 S.W. 1001, 4 L.R.A. 594 (1889); Schmidt v.
Rowse, 35 Mo. App. 288 (1889); Stewart v. City of Clinton, 79 Mo. 603 (1883);
Benson v. Chicago & Alton R.R., 78 Mo. 504 (1883); McCormick v. K.C., St.
Joseph & C.B. R.R., supra n. 15.
23. 137 Mo. App. 62, 119 S.W. 509 (1909).
24. Brown-& Brothers v. Illius 27 Conn. 84 (1858); City of Jacksonville
v. Lambert, 62 Ill. 519 (1872); Niagra Oil Co. v. Jackson, 48 Ind. App. 238, 91
N.E. 825 (1910); Livezey v. Schmidt, 96 Ky. 441, 29 S.W. 25 (1895); Thomas v.
Concordia Cannery Co., 68 Mo. App. 350 (1897); Carpenter v. City of Versailles,
65 S.W. 2d 957 (Mo. App. 1933); Gawtry v. Leland, 31 N.J. Eq. 385 (1879);
Adams v. Clover Hill Farms, 86 Ore. 140, 167 Pac. 1015 (1917).
25. TIFFANY, REAL PROPERTY § 745 (3rd ed. 1939). See also GOULD, LAW OF
WATERS § 278 (2d ed. 1891); WooDs, LAW OF NUISANCES § 115 (2d ed. 1883).
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surface water onto the plaintiff's premises, the defendant city's action constituted
the maintenance of a nuisance, for which it would be liable for damages to the

plaintiff.

JOHN

E.

YOUNG

TORTS-CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE-SPEED AND THE ASSURED CLEAR DISTANCE RULE

Halfacre v. Hart,
The plaintiff was driving his car on a road, 18 to 20 feet wide, at a speed of
45 to 50 miles per hour. Plaintiff was driving downhill on the inside of a curve so
sharp as to limit his forward vision to 60 to 70 feet. While in such a position
the plaintiff was confronted with defendant's car approaching him on the wrong
side of the road by one and a half to two feet. Plaintiff, finding himself in this
situation guided his car to his right without applying his brakes. This caused
plaintiff's right front wheel to edge onto the soft shoulder, and sent the plaintiff's
car skidding back across the highway and over a steep bank, resulting in the
present suit for damages and injuries suffered. At no time did the two automobiles
contact each other. At the close of the plaintiff's evidence, the court sustained the
defendant's motion for a directed verdict on the ground that the plaintiff, in driving
his car around this sharp curve at the speed mentioned and with such limited
vision ahead, was guilty of negligence which proximately contributed to the accident. The Circuit Court of Appeals of Tennessee reversed and remanded the case,
holding that the question of the plaintiff's negligence was a question for the jury
to decide. The Supreme Court of Tennessee denied the petition for certiorari.
The question here presented is whether it is negligence as a matter of law for
one to drive an automobile at such speed as to be unable to stop within the distance
measured by the driver's range of vision. Those cases which have held that it
is negligence as a matter of law to drive at such speed that it is impossible to stop
within the range of vision have come to be known as the "assured clear distance"
3
rule.2 The earlier Missouri view seems to have been in accord with this rule.
Many courts, however, have been forced to retreat from this developed mechanical
rule of law, which may have been a valid rule in the early day of the automobile,
but would seem to be unrealistically restrictive of the speed of the present day
automobile.4
1. 241 S.W. 2d 421 (Tenn. 1951).
2. Haines v. Carroll, 126 Kan. 408, 267 Pac. 986 (1928); Russell v. Szczawinski, 268 Mich. 112, 255 N.W. 731 (1934); 23 CAL. L. REv. 498 (1935); 27 ILL. L.
REV. 570 (1933); 22 MINN. L. REV. 877 (1938); 4 ROCKY MT. L. REv. 156 (1932);
97 A.L.R. 546 (1935); 87 A.L.R. 900 (1933); .58 A.L.R. 1493 (1929); 44 A.L.R.
1403 (1926).
3. Solomon v. Duncan, 194 Mo. App. 517 (1916), where the court sets
out the doctrine of the "assured clear distance rule" taken from Lauson v. Fond
du Lac, 141 Wis. 57, 123 N.W. 629, 25 L.R.A. (N.S.) 40, 135 Am. St. Rep. 30
(1909): "If his light be such that he can see objects for only a distance of ten
feet, then he should so regulate his speed so as to be able to stop his machine
within that distance; and if he fails to do so, and an accident results from such
failure, no recovery can be had. This, it seems to us, is the minimum degree of
care that should be required."
4. PROSSER, TORTS 286 (1941).
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Most of the applications of this rule have arisen in the situation where the
plaintiff is driving at a speed where he cannot stop when an unanticipated defect
or obstacle suddenly appears on an apparently safe highway. In one state this
"assured clear distance rule" was adopted by statute, but the courts of that state
found it necessary to introduce modifications.5
In the Missouri case of Sirounian v. Terminal R.R. Assn of St. Loui, ° the
court clearly renounces the view that it is always negligence as a matter of law to
drive at such speed that one cannot stop within the distance that he can see ahead
of him. While this case deals with the case-of the range of vision of one's headlights,
that situation would seem analogous with the "blind curve" type of situation in
the instant case.
The Tennessee court pointed out that the plaintiff had the right to assume
that the approaching automobile, if there were one on the other end of the "blind
curve," would be obeying the mandate of the law and only be occupying its right
side of the highway. A Missouri court has held that a driver of a truck is not
required to search the highway for unlighted vehicles, but rather could assume
that other automobiles would be provided with tail lights as required by statute.7
Also, the driver of a vehicle may presume that the other drivers on the road will
exercise the highest degree of care in operating their vehicles.8
MANUEL DRUMm, III
ToRTs-INJuiy TO INviTEE-OccuPiER's DUTY To
CONTROL THiRD PERSON

Oliver v. Oakwood Country Club"
Plaintiff, aged 13, was injured when a companion shot him in the eye with an
air gun as the two and others were approaching the "caddie house" on defendant's
golf course to present themselves for employment as caddies. The trial court directed
a verdict for the defendant country club at the close of plaintiff's evidence. On
appeal it was held that although a duty was owed to plaintiff as an invitee to
exercise reasonable care in controlling third persons on the premises so they do
not injure him, no breach of that duty by the defendant was shown since defendant
5. Note, 24 IowA L. REv. 128 (1938).
6. 236 Mo. App. 938, 160 S.W. 2d 451 (1942). Here the court at page 455
states: "We are not unaware that as a general proposition of law, a motorist is
not in all events and under all circumstances to be held guilty of contributory
negligence as a matter of law merely because he drives at such a speed that he
cannot stop within that distance that his headlights shine out ahead of him. On the
contrary, if there is conflicting evidence on the vital questions touching the
plaintiff's negligence, and the attending circumstances are such that reasonable
minds might well differ as to whether he was to be excused for driving at such
speed as to make it impossible for him to stop within the range of his headlights,
the question of his contributory negligence is properly held to be an issue for
determination by the jury."
7. Smith v. Producers Cold Storage, 128 S.W. 299 (Mo. App. 1939).
8. Wheeler v. Breeding, 109 S.W. 2d 1237 (Mo. App. 1937).
1.
245 S.W. 2d 37 (Mo. 1951).
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol18/iss1/9
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neither knew nor should have known that the exercise of' control of the third
person was necessary to prevent harm. There was no evidence of knowledge of
the possession or use of firearms or air rifles by anyone on the premises.
The court determined that plaintiff was an invitee in this situation inasmuch
as he was going on defendant's premises for their mutual business benefit and
had been invited to do so on previous occasions. 2 Plaintiff was approaching the
caddie house by a path through some woods, which was the shortest route from
the car line. The court did not directly discuss the question of whether he was on
a part of the premises where he was expected and had a right to be as an invitee,
although it must have so assumed in holding a duty was owed him as an invitee
rather than as a licensee or trespasser. 3
An occupier of land owes a duty to invitees to use due care to protect them
from injury on his land, both from dangerous conditions and from affirmative
acts of negligence on the part of the occupier.4 This general rule is said to apply
5
both to the private occupier and the occupier holding his land open to the public.
The basis is often stated to be the occupier's superior knowledge of the dangers,
coupled with the notion that a business guest ought to be able to feel that the
premises have been in some manner made safe for him. 6
This duty has been extended in the case of property held open to the public
to include protection to invitees from dangerous third persons on the premises
other than servants of the occupier7 The duty to control the conduct of a third
person to protect invitees has long been found in such businesses as theatres and
12
shows," carriers,0 restaurants and taverns,10 ball parks,' 1 public picnics, inn2. Porchey v. Kelling, 353 Mo. 1034, 185 S.W. 2d 820 (1945); Glaser v.
Rothschild, 221 Mo. 180, 120 S.W. 1, 22 L.R.A. (N.S.) 1045, 17 Ann Cas. 576
(1909); 65 C.J.S. Negligence § 43 (4) (c).
3. Piggly Wiggly, Macon, Inc. v. Kelsey, 83 Ga. App. 526, 64 S.E. 2d 201
(1951); PROSSER, TORTS § 79 at p. 640 (1941); 65 C.J.S. Negligence § 48(a);
22 Mo. DIG. Negligence § 32 (3).
4. Berberet v. Electric Park Amusement Co., 319 Mo. 275, 3 S.W. 2d 1025,
61 A.L.R. 1269 (1928); PROSSER, TORTS § 79 (1941); McCleary, Liability of a
Possessor of Land in Missouri to Persons Injured While on the Land, 1 Mo. L. REv.
45 (1936).
5. PROSSER, TORTS § 79 at p. 636 (1941).
6. Cameron v. Small, 182 S.W. 2d 565 (Mo. 1944); Murray v. Ralph D'Oench
Co., 347 Mo. 365, 147 S.W. 2d 623 (1941).
7. RESTATEMENT, TORTS § 348 (1934); Harper and Kime, The Duty to
Control the Conduct of Another, 43 YALE L. J. 886 (1934).
8. Worcerter v. Theatrical Enterprises Corp., 28 Cal. App. 2d 116, 82 P. 2d
68 (1938); Central Theatres, Inc. v. Wilkinson, 154 Fla. 589, 18 So. 2d 755 (1944);
Hawkins v. Maine & New Hampshire Theatres Co., 132 Me. 1, 164 Atl. 628 (1933);

Dickinson v. Eden Theatre Co., 360 Mo. 941, 231 S.W. 2d 609 (1950); Hart v.
Hercules Theatre Corp., 258 App. Div. 537, 17 N.Y.S. 2d 441 (2nd Dep't 1940);
Daniels v. Firm Amusement Corp., 158 Misc. 251, 285 N.Y. Supp. 557 (Mun. Ct.
1935); Whitfield v. Cox, 189 Va. 219, 52 S.E. 2d 72 (1949); 62 C. J. Theatres and
Shows § 63; other Mo. cases collected 26 Mo. DIG. Theatres and Shows §§ 6 (14),
6(33); see also 16 A.L.R. 2d 904; (collected cases on amusements); 20 A.L.R. 2d 8
(collected cases on pushing by third persons).
9. Culbreth v. Pullman Co., 293 Fed. 402 (M.D. Ala. 1923) noted 22 MIcH.
31 Ind. App.
v. Dawson,Repository,
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5

public parks,
skating rinks,' banks,16 department storesy poolrooms,' and swimming pools.19
The duty to control the conduct of a third person on one's premises falls
somewhere in between the duties with respect to dangerous conditions and affirmative negligence on the part of the occupier. It more resembles a "condition" in
that there is no affirmative act on the part of the occupier, but only passive negligence in failing to act with respect to the danger. It does resemble an affirmative
act, however, in that it "comes at" the invitee, rather than the invitee walking
into it. Because of the similarity to a dangerous condition, many courts lump
the duty with respect to dangerous third persons under the duty concerned with
conditions.
The principal case is believed to be the first in Missouri finding this duty in
the case of a private occupier, and as such is one of the few in this country. 20
8

(1903); Thompson v. St. Louis Public Service Co., 242 S.W. 2d 299 (Mo. App.
1951); Lige v. Chicago B. & Q. R.R., 275 Mo. 249, 204 S.W. 508, 1918F L.R.A.
548 (1918); Utterback v. St. Louis & S.F. Ry., 189 S.W. 1171 (Mo. 1916); Hillebrecht v. Pittsburgh Rys., 55 Pa. Sup. Ct. 204 (1913); Harper and Kime, The
Duty to Control the Conduct of Another, 43 YALE L. J. 886 at 901 (1934); 13
C.J.S. Carriers § 695; other Mo. cases collected 6 Mo. DIG. Carriers § 284; 1918F
L.R.A. 555; 15 A.L.R. 868 (1921), supplemented by 42 A.L.R. 168 (1926), 43 A.L.R.
1035 (1926) (annotations on carrier liability); 2 A.L.R. DIG. Carriers §§ 203-207
(annotated cases collected).
Missouri cases generally hold that a carrier must use the highest degree of
care to protect passengers from fellow passengers. Abernathy v. Missouri Pacific
R.R., 217 S.W. 568 (Mo. App. 1920). But the carrier must only use ordinary care
to protect passengers from violence at the hands of strangers not in the carrier's
control. Williams v. East St. Louis & S. R.R., 207 Mo. App. 233, 232 S.W. 759
(1921).
10. Davidson v. Harris, Inc., 79 Ga. App. 788, 54 S.E. 2d 290 (1949); Sidebottom v. Aubrey, 267 Ky. 45, 101 S.W. 2d 212 (1937); Molloy v. Coletti, 114 Misc.
177, J186 N.Y. Supp. 730 (Sup. Ct. 1921); Peck v. Gerber, 154 Ore. 126, 59 P. 2d
675, 106 A.L.R. 996, 16 ORE. L. REv. 98, 35 MicH. L. REv. 843 (1936); 20 A.L.R.
2d 8 (1951) (collected cases on pushing).
11. Hughes v. St. Louis Nat. League Baseball Club, Inc., 339 Mo. 993, 224
S.W. 2d 989, 16 Mo. L. REv. 189 (1949); 16 A.L.R. 2d 904 (1951) (collected
amusement cases); 20 A.L.R. 2d 8 (1951) (collected cases on pushing).
12. Mastad v. Swedish Brethern, 83 Minn. 40, 85 N.W. 912, 53 L.R.A. 803,
85 Am. St. Rep. 446 (1901); 16 A.L.R. 2d 904 (1951) (collected amusement cases).
13. 106 A.L.R. 1003 (1937) (cases collected on this point).
14. Indianapolis St. Ry. v. Dawson, 31 Ind. App. 605, 68 N.E. 909 (1903);
Blakely v. White Star Line, 154 Mich. 635, 118 N.W. 482, 19 L.R.A. (N.S.) 772,
129 Am. St. Rep. 496 (1908); 20 A.L.R. 2d 8 (1951) (collected pushing cases).
15. 168 A.L.R. 899 (1947) (injury to one skater by another); 20 A.L.R. 2d
8 (1951) (collected pushing cases).
16. Sinn v. Farmers' Deposit Savings Bank, 300 Pa. 85, 150 Atl. 163, 79 U. or
PA. L. REv. 368, 16 ST. Louis L. REv. 257 (1930).
17. Noonan v. Sheridan, 230 Ky. 162, 18 S.W. 2d 976 (1929); Barnes v. J. C.
Penney Co., 190 Wash. 633, 70 P. 2d 311, 36 MIcH. L. REv. 1027 (1930).
18. Moone v. Smith, 6 Ga. App. 649, 65 S.E. 712, 8 MIcH. L. REv. 424 (1910).
19. Boardman v. Ottinger et ax., 161 Ore. 202, 88 P. 2d 967 (1939).
20. Only one other case has been found in the United States finding this
duty in the case of a private occupier. In re Sabbatino & Co., 150 F. 2d 101 (2d
Cir. 1945). In that case plaintiff's decedent was shot by the vice-president of
defendant corporation in the "inner office" of the corporation. The corporation was
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol18/iss1/9
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The reason for this is probably that the necessary factual situation would almost
never arise on private property, where few people gather at one time. It is to be
noted that the defendant here, although a private occupier, still had large numbers
of people on its land in members and employees. Almost all the cases involving
dangerous third persons have arisen in situations where the property has been
held open to the public to enter as patrons. Since the supreme court has found a
duty in the instant case on the part of the private occupier, it would seem that
these cases involving business premises would apply by analogy although club
members are a more limited group of patrons.
Assuming now that there is a duty to use reasonable care with respect to
dangerous third persons for the benefit of invitees, how is that duty discharged?
With respect to ordinary dangerous conditions it is usually said to be sufficient
to warn the invitee so that he may avoid the danger, unless (1) the warning would
clearly not be sufficient to allow the invitee to protect himself, or (2) unless the
only way to avoid the danger would be by giving up a right which the invitee had.2 '
In the case of the common carrier, for instance, warning of a dangerous condition
is not sufficient if the invitee must give up his right to use the carrier in order to
avoid the danger.2 2 This same general principle seems to have been applied to
cases involving dangerous third persons on business premises. A warning is usually
sufficient if the invitee can then avoid the danger by leaving the premises. If, however, after being warned, there is no opportunity for the invitee to leave safely,
the occupier may be held to use further means to protect his invitee.23 Again in
the case of the common carrier, steps must be taken to protect the passenger if his
only means of avoiding the dangerous person is giving up the right to use the
4
carrier.2
There is one further possibility, seemingly not specifically dealt with by the
dangerous third person cases: suppose the dangerous third person "carries his own
warning"? In the case of a condition on land, there is not even a duty to warn if
found negligent inasmuch as the president, who was present, knew the vice-president
was drunk, and knew that he got a gun out of the company safe in time for the
president to have acted to prevent the injury. Although the matter was not discussed, this "inner office" was apparently a private part of the premises not open
to the public.
It is possible that there are a few other similar cases. Because of the courts'
tendency to speak of the dangerous third person as a "condition" it is not always
possible to tell from a digest paragraph what type of "condition" the digested case
is about.
21. PROSSER, TORTS § 79 at pp. 642-643 (1941); RESTATEMENT, TORTS § 343
(1934).
22. PROSSER, TORTS § 79 p. 642, n. 89 (1941); RESTATEMENT, TORTS § 343
(1934).
23. Terre Haute, Indianapolis & Eastern Traction Co. v. Scott, 91 Ind. App.
690, 170 N.E. 341 (1930); PROSSER, TORTS § 79 at pp. 643-644 (1941); RESTATENiENT, TORTS § 348 (1934); Harper and Kime, The Dity to Control the Conduct
of Another, 43 YALE L. J. 886 at p 904 (1934); cases on warning in general
collected 65 C.J.S. Nelgigence p. 528, n. 98, and p. 533, n. 21.
24. PROSSER, ToRTs § 79, p. 642, n. 89 (1941); RESTATEMENT, TORTS § 348
(1934); Harper and Kime, The Ditty to Control the Conduct of Another, 43 YALE
L. J. 886 (1934).
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the condition is apparent and will be seen and avoided by the invitee if he uses
due care. It would seem then in the case of a dangerous third person, if a warning
would be sufficient in a particular situation, no warning would be necessary if the
third person "carried his own warning" so that the invitee could observe the danger
and take steps to protect himself, as by leaving the premises. This theory has
not been advarxced in any of the cases found.
DONALD

G.

STUBBS

WILLS AND ADMINISTRATION-STATUTORY ALLOWANCES FOR THE

SURVIVING SPOUSE-PROCEDURE

In re Polizoe's Estate (Sclavos v. &pelbrink),
When H and W were married W owned certain household furnishings. Later
W died and H was appointed administrator of her estate. H did not list the furnishings on the inventory of W's estate, for he believed that under § 462.450 of
the Missouri Revised Statutes (1949), they became his absolute property and as
such were not part of W's estate for purposes of administration. He rented the
furnishings to others, and continued to do so until his death. After his death,
Spelbrink was appointed executor of H's estate. Spelbrink continued to rent the
furnishings and listed them as part of the estate of H at a valuation of $200. W's
estate was still not closed, so Spelbrink filed a settlement therein and was appointed administrator de bonis non of her estate. Thomas, a son of W by a former
marriage, filed a petition under § 462.400, Missouri Revised Statutes (1949), to
compel Spelbrink as executor of the estate of H to appear and account to the
estate of W for the furnishings and proceeds from the rental thereof. The probate
court ordered Spelbrink as administrator de bonis non of Vs estate to inventory
the furnishings for the estate of W; and as executor of H's estate to pay over to
the estate of W the rents he had collected; and further, as administrator de bonis
non of W's estate to continue to rent said furnishings for the estate of W. Spelbrink
appealed to the circuit court contesting the order to pay to the estate of W all
rentals he had collected as executor of H. This was the sole question on that appeal,
and the circuit court affirmed the order of the probate court. Spelbrink then appealed
in proper form to the St. Louis Court of Appeals, which again affirmed the order.
This decision is of considerable importance, especially as a guide to administrators and executors. Since almost every decedents estate contains household
furnishings and other personalty covered by § 462.450, the procedure under that
statute is in constant use. The court's construction of the statute in this case
makes the procedure quite clear, so that in the future administrators and executors
will be certain as to their duties with regard thereto.
A brief analysis of the issue involved and the manner in which the court
handled it would seem to be in order. The claim of Thomas that the furnishings
and proceeds thereof be returned to the estate of W could only be supported if the
1. 246 S.W. 391 (Mo. 1952), transfer to Missouri Supreme Court refused
May 14, 1952.
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furnishings did not properly belong to H. 2 Under § 462.450, Missouri Revised
Statutes (1949), the furnishings became the "absolute property" of H as the surviving spouse of W at her death. At first glance it would seem that if they became
the absolute property of H then they would no longer be part of W's estate and
would not have to be inventoried as part of her estate. However, the statute
places a $500 maximum on the amount of furnishings that become the absolute
property of the surviving spouse. Who is to determine when the $500 limit has
been reached? If the furnishings are not required to be inventoried, then it would
be left to the surviving spouse to so determine the value of the furnishings he or
she kept under the statute as his or her absolute property. This would not only
open the door to fraud, but would be an excellent place for honest mistakes in
judgment. It is certainly against public policy to allow beneficiaries and distributees to be subjected to possible prejudices against their interests without a court
approval. For instance, if no inventory were required of the household furnishings
under § 462.450, then the court would not be able to determine whether the furnishings claimed thereunder were actually worth $500 (which is allowed) or $1500.
Thus, a surviving spouse could keep any amount of furnishings by merely claiming
their value was only $500. This practice, of course, should not be allowed, and
this decision prevents it. By construction, the court held that under this statute
the furnishings had to be inventoried by the administrator or executor, then, on
application to the court, the surviving spouse could have $500 worth of said
furnishings set aside prior to administration as his or her absolute property. Thus,
the requirement of inventory does not subject the property to probate or administration nor does it subject the surviving spouse to any inconvenience, for the
court further held that such furnishings were not to be taken into possession by
3
the administrator or executor as is the case with other personalty of the estate.
The general policy of the statute is obvious.4 It was the legislature's intent
that the surviving spouse and family of a decedent be temporarily provided for
after his death and before completion of the administration of his estate. Ordinarily
the estate is tied up pending final settlement, and the surviving spouse would be
deprived of the use of any property until the estate was finally probated.
This inconvenience and hardship is alleviated by several statutes of which this is
one. The statute allows the surviving spouse to remain in possession, and provides
that certain furnishings become the absolute property of said spouse. However,
the court in this case has by construction required that before the furnishings become the absolute property of the survivor, they must be listed on the inventory
to the probate court and then, on application, set aside to the survivor. All this
case does is provide a procedure under the statute which allows the court to
supervise the transaction to assure fair dealing by all parties. This construction
2. Mo. REv. STAT. § 462.400 (1949).
3. See Monahan v. Monahan's Estate, 232 Mo. App. 91, 89 S.W. 2d 153
(1936); Waters v. Herboth, 178 Mo. 166, 77 S.W. 305 (1903).
4. See McDonnell v. Oxler's Estate, 235 S.W. 2d 568 (Mo. 1951); Jaeglin v.
Moakley, 236 Mo. App. 254, 151 S.W. 2d 524 (1941); In re Bernay's Estate, 334
Mo. 135, 126 S.W. 2d 209 (1939).
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does not do the statute violence, nor does it contravene the policy, for the survivor
still remains in possession and is required only to apply to the court to have the
furnishings alloted to her before the estate is administered.
The construction placed on this statute is believed to be not only sound and
5
fair, but in line with the construction and policy of the companion statutes which
provide for allowances to the surviving spouse and family.0
SAM R. GARDNER

5. Sections 208 and 214 of

KELLEY'S PROBATE GUIDE

(4th ed. 1913) state

that even though some of the Missouri Statutes declare certain articles to be the
"absolute property" of the surviving spouse, it is better practice to include those
articles in an inventory presented to the court. This makes possible an appraisal and
an order of court based thereon that certain named goods be set aside as the
absolute property of the surviving spouse. This comment refers to goods which
are limited by a certain total value, and not to articles specifically named in the
statute which are given absolutely regardless of value. This early comment by
Kelley as to what is the better practice is made mandatory by this case.
6. Mo. REv. STAT. § 462.010 (1949) provides that the executor or administrator must take all of the property into possession except that which is the
absolute property of the surviving spouse. Then § 462.020 requires the executor or
administrator to inventory and appraise all the property without mentioning any
exceptions. See Hiler v. Cox, 210 Mo. 696, 109 S.W. 679 (1908); Lewis v. Carson,
93 Mo. 587, 6 S.W. 365 (1887); McCarty v. Frazer, 62 Mo. 263 (1876); In re
Van Fossen, 13 S.W. 2d 1076 (Mo. App. 1929).
Section 462.460 is a statute similar to the one involved in this case, and has
been construed as requiring inventory and appraisal by the executor or administrator plus a setting aside by the court. See: Griswold v. Mattix, 21 Mo. App. 282
(1886); State ex. rel. Meyer v. Arnold, 220 S.W. 2d 942 (Mo. 1949).
Section 461.640 is another similar type statute and requires inventory and
appraisal before the court can set aside the absolute property of the surviving
spouse and children under 18 years. See: Odom v. Langston, 351 Mo. 609, 173 S.W.
2d 826 (1943); Pidcock v. Buffam, 61 Mo. 370 (1875); Craslin v. Baker, 8 Mo.
437 (1844).
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